The cheapest truck is not the cheapest truck

A long line of truck cabs parked nose out in a terminal holding yard at dusk, lights on and the tarmac still wet.

Every textbook on supplier management will tell you the same thing about hauliers. Build long term relationships. Commit volume in exchange for better terms. Reward loyalty with loyalty.

In a settled haulage market that is good advice. In a congested port city with expensive diesel and more freight than trucks, it describes a world that does not exist. Here a haulier agrees your job in the morning and takes a better offer before lunch, and no amount of relationship building changes the arithmetic that made him do it.

This is the fifth essay in a series on the funding gap in freight forwarding, following the bank you did not know you were running, the five clocks, why growth is the dangerous part and what to do with no leverage. Figures are invented and rounded.

I want to make two arguments here. The first is that you should stop trying to buy payment terms from hauliers entirely. The second is that you are comparing haulage quotes against completely the wrong number, and fixing that is worth more than any rate negotiation you will ever have.

Stop trying to buy time from a haulier

The instinct is understandable. Your money is going out too early, the haulier is one of the people it goes out to, so you try to push his payment further away. Fifteen days becomes thirty. Problem partly solved.

It will not work, and it is worth understanding why rather than just being told.

A haulier's business is brutally short cycle. Diesel is bought today. The driver is paid this week. A repair cannot wait. Meanwhile his truck spends hours in a queue earning nothing. He is under more cash pressure than you are, not less, and asking him to fund you is asking the weaker balance sheet to carry the stronger one.

So he says yes and prices it in, or he says yes and takes a better job when one appears, or he says no. In a market where he has more work than trucks, the one thing he will not do is give you free credit out of goodwill.

Push this lever and you will spend political capital to move a small number, while making yourself a less attractive customer at exactly the moment you need him most. Put it down. It belongs to a different country.

What he is actually optimising, and it is not your rate

Here is the thing that changes the conversation completely, and once you see it you cannot unsee it.

A haulier does not maximise the rate per trip. He maximises the number of trips per month.

A truck that does six good turns a month at a fair rate earns far more than one that does four turns at a premium rate, and it costs the same to own either way. Every hour that truck is not moving is money leaving his pocket, and almost none of those lost hours are things he controls.

Now think about where those lost hours come from. Waiting because the entry was not filed before arrival. Waiting for a delivery order that somebody is still chasing. Arriving at a site that is not ready to offload. Being sent for a container that is not actually available. Sitting with an empty that the depot will not receive, unable to take the next job because your box is still on his trailer.

Every one of those is inside your control, and every one of them costs him a trip.

Which means you have something to trade that costs you no money at all. A forwarder who reliably gives a haulier clean, fast turns is worth more to that haulier than one who pays a slightly better rate and wastes two days of his week. That is loyalty bought with operations rather than cash, and operations is the one currency a small company in a price war actually has.

This is the same pattern that runs through this whole series. The money is not lost inside the haulage rate. It is lost in the gap between your documentation and his wheels.

Assume he will leave

Even after all that, he will sometimes take the better offer. Accept it. It is a spot market and it is behaving exactly as a spot market does. Treating each defection as a betrayal wastes energy that would be better spent designing around it.

So design around it.

Keep a panel, not a partner. Five to eight hauliers you have used, not one you depend on. The cost of maintaining relationships you do not need this week is the price of having one available the week you do.

Keep a record of who left, and when. Not to punish anybody, but because defection rate is a real attribute of a supplier and you currently carry it as a feeling rather than a fact. Some hauliers are reliable and cost more. That is not a contradiction, it is a product.

Use the local instrument that works, which is money on acceptance, forfeited on abandonment. It is not elegant and it is not what the textbook says. It is what changes behaviour in a market where the alternative is a handshake and hope.

Now the part that is actually worth money

Everything above is useful. This next part is the reason I wrote the essay.

When you compare two haulage quotes, you are comparing them against each other. You should be comparing them against what the container costs you per day if the truck does not come.

Once free time has expired, a container at a terminal is running two or three meters at once: demurrage to the shipping line, storage to the terminal, and later detention on the empty. Illustratively, suppose that comes to something in the region of a hundred and twenty thousand naira a day for a forty foot box. Your own numbers will differ. The principle will not.

Now put a haulier who wants a hundred and fifty thousand naira more than the cheapest bid next to that number.

He is worth paying the moment he saves you more than a day and a quarter.

And if the cheap one abandons you and the box sits for three days while you find somebody else, that decision cost you three hundred and sixty thousand naira in order to save a hundred and fifty.

This is not a close call. It is not even the same order of magnitude. And yet the haulage rate is negotiated, hard, by somebody whose job is to get the rate down, while the demurrage consequence lands on a different line, in a different week, on somebody else's report.

Between two departments again.

So segment by exposure, not by relationship

The practical rule is simple enough to use on every container, and it is not "always pay more" or "always pay less".

When free time is nearly gone, buy certainty and pay above market without apology. You are not overpaying for transport. You are buying an insurance policy against a meter that is about to start, and it is cheap insurance.

When there is a week of free time left, take the cheapest bid and accept the risk. If he lets you down you have room to recover, and the saving is real.

That is one decision, made per container, using two numbers you already have: the days of free time remaining and the daily cost after they expire. It takes about fifteen seconds once the habit exists.

Your competitors are making this call on instinct, or worse, on a standing instruction to always take the lowest quote. That standing instruction is costing them real money on exactly the containers where it matters most, and they will never see it, because the saving is visible and the consequence is not.

The underlying idea

If there is one sentence to take from this essay, it is this.

A haulage rate is not a transport decision. It is a risk decision about a meter that has already started running.

Price it that way, and a whole set of arguments you have been having with hauliers stops mattering, while a decision nobody in your company is currently making starts saving you more than those arguments ever could.

The final essay in this series is the practical one: the seven numbers that would have shown you all of this months ago, none of which appear anywhere on a profit and loss account.